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ABSTRACT
This thesis examines debates over the meaning of "free labor" in nineteenth 
century Hawaii. It argues that "free labor" was a sufficiently expansive concept 
that American missionaries and settlers intent on introducing "free labor" to 
Hawaii as part of their "civilizing" mission actually laid the foundations for sugar 
plantation agriculture, which had historically been associated with enslaved labor 
elsewhere in the world. The malleability of "free labor" as a concept allowed 
Hawaii's sugar planters to defend Hawaii's labor system against accusations of 
using unfree labor. It also justified state intervention by the Hawaiian government 
for schemes to import East Asian indentured labor for the plantations. Ironically, 
although Americans had created Hawaii's indentured labor system, the American 
annexation of Hawaii in 1898 resulted in the end of this system. This paper 
argues that this development resulted from the imposition of a different definition 
of "free labor," which had developed on the mainland in tandem with the 
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1This thesis is about two ironies in the history of 19th century Hawaii. First, 
American settlers, most of them Northerners, including antislavery missionaries, saw 
themselves as redeeming the Hawaiian people from the tyranny of Hawaii’s system of 
rule by chiefs, but they recreated Hawaii as a plantation society, whose main crop was 
sugar and whose labor was overwhelmingly indentured and unfree. The second irony is 
that the system of indentured or “coolie” labor created by Americans came to an end as a 
result of the United States’ annexation of Hawaii. For all the other problems that came 
with the expansion of empire, it brought an end to the system of unfree labor that anti­
slavery missionaries had wrought.
This paper examines how debates over labor in Hawaii, which were inextricably 
tied to debates over labor migration, shaped relations between Hawaii and the United 
States. These debates began at least as early as the 1850s, when American 
Congregationalist missionaries and a few British and American lawyers and businessmen 
(known in colloquial Hawaiian, like white foreigners generally, as haoles) began to exert 
disproportionate influence on the Hawaiian monarchy. They continued through the 
creation of a plantation system, and reemerged with a vengeance on the eve of American 
annexation. What did free labor and slavery mean in these newly acquired provinces of 
American empire?
Most of the historiography on Hawaii, America, and annexation tends to 
emphasize American empire. To some extent, this emphasis mirrors the concerns of 
contemporaries and the availability of sources. Because the annexation of Hawaii 
happened in the context of the Spanish-American War in 1898, larger questions of 
American imperialism generally tend to obscure other concerns. Issues like Americans’
2own rationalization of their “aberrational burst of conventional colonial rule,” or the 
geopolitical desirability of acquiring one of the most strategically important ports in the 
Pacific at Pearl Harbor were important dimensions of the story of American empire in 
Hawaii.1 But examining the Hawaiian-American relationship through the lens of evolving 
ideas about labor illuminates the ideological context of annexation.2 As Paul Kramer 
points out in a 2011 review essay, “imperial histories” of America in the world have the 
potential to encompass a much broader range of issues, provided they can “move to the 
side the mostly unproductive question of whether the United States is or has ‘an 
empire.’”3 In Hawaii’s case, examining the interplay between evolving American 
anxieties about labor and the processes of Americanization and annexation points to the 
specific consequences of American expansion.4
This paper argues that the history of labor in Hawaii needs to be integrated into a 
growing historiography on the global history of the “coolie trade.” The American Empire 
is not the only empire at play here. While other scholars have examined the rise of 
“coolies” in the British Empire, the Caribbean, and the mainland United States, little 
research places Hawaii within these broader conversations about coolies and the
1 Paul Kramer, “Power and Connection: Imperial Histories o f  the United States and the World,” American 
H istorical Review  116, no. 5 (December, 2011), 1372; Thomas J. Osborne, “Trade or War? America’s 
Annexation o f  Hawaii Reconsidered,” Pacific H istorical Review  50, no. 3 (August, 1981), 285-307.
2 One somewhat dated piece does provide a sparse outline o f  the interplay o f  the contract labor issue and 
U.S.-Hawaiian relations, but makes little reference to ideology. Donald Rowland, “The United States and 
the Contract Labor Question in Hawaii, 1862-1900,” Pacific H istorical Review  2, no. 3 (September, 1933), 
249-269.
3 Paul Kramer, “Power and Connection,” 1350.
4 Examples o f  existing works that touch only slightly on the role o f  labor issues in the lead-up to American 
annexation o f  Hawaii include Merze Tate, The United States and the Hawaiian Kingdom: A Political 
H istory (New Haven, 1965) and Thomas J. Osborne, “Empire Can W ait”: American Opposition to 
H awaiian Annexation, 1893-1898  (Kent, Ohio, 1981). Tate’s second book on U.S.-Hawaiian relations does 
make a few references to the coolie issue and the rhetoric o f  free labor surrounding it, but still focuses 
mainly on commercial questions surrounding the U.S. sugar industry. See Merze Tate, Hawaii: Reciprocity 
or Annexation (East Lansing, Mich., 1968), 141-142, 149-150, 246, 248.
3aftermath of slavery.5 It also argues that the history of labor in Hawaii needs to be 
integrated into the already voluminous historiography of American slavery.6 The 
migration of laborers into Hawaii during the sugar boom took place in the context of 
American anxieties about the persistence of unfree forms of labor after the Thirteenth 
Amendment, particularly the reviled “coolie trade” in the Pacific Ocean basin.
Historians of Hawaii have uncovered many of the components of the story of 
labor migration to the islands, but these studies tend to remain within the bailiwick of 
Hawaiian history or the history of specific ethnic groups. Ralph Simpson Kuykendall’s 
three volume narrative synthesis, The Hawaiian Kingdom, published in 1938, 1954, and 
1967, remains the standard work on nineteenth-century Hawaii, and offers a useful 
narrative outline of Hawaii’s nineteenth-century history of labor importation. However, 
Kuykendall did not spend significant time exploring the tension between free-labor ideals 
and anxieties about “coolies.”7 The standard labor history of Hawaii, Edward D. 
Beechert’s Working in Hawaii: A Labor History (1985), provides a good survey of 
Hawaiian labor history, but does not delve deeply into the ideological backdrop of 
contract labor or debates about the legitimacy of importing “coolies.”8 Another subfield, 
consisting of studies of specific ethnic groups within Hawaii’s immigration history, also 
addresses issues relevant to the issue of “coolies” and transnational ideas about free and
5 Madhavi Kale, Fragments o f  Empire: Capital, Slavery, and Indentured Labor in the British Caribbean  
(Philadelphia, 2010).
6 David Northrup, “Free and Unfree Labor Migration, 1600-1900: An Introduction,” Journal o f  World 
History 14, no. 2 (June, 2003), 125-130; Matthew Pratt Guterl, “After Slavery: Asian Labor, the American 
South, and the Age o f  Emancipation,” Journal o f  World H istory 14, no. 2 (June, 2003), 209-241; David 
Eltis, ed., C oerced and Free M igrations: G lobal Perspectives (Stanford, 2004).
7 Ralph S. Kuykendall, The Hawaiian Kingdom, Volume I: 1778-1854, Foundation and Transformation 
(Honolulu, 1938); Ralph S. Kuykendall, The Hawaiian Kingdom, Volume II: 1854-1874, Twenty Critical 
Years (Honolulu, 1954); Ralph S. Kuykendall, The Hawaiian Kingdom, Volume III: 1874-1893, The 
Kalakaua Dynasty (Honolulu, 1967).
8 Edward D. Beechert, Working in Hawaii: A Labor H istory (Honolulu, 1985).
4unfree labor without drawing on those connections specifically. In Pau Hana: Plantation 
Life and Labor in Hawaii, 1835-1920 (1983), for example, Ronald Takaki places 
Japanese migrants at the center of his story. Takaki provides a rich portrait of the lived 
experiences of plantation workers, but largely leaves out debates over the meaning of 
their presence.9
I am not the first historian to suggest a connection between African slavery in the 
US South and Hawaiian history. In a fascinating review of Takaki’s book, Alexander 
Saxton reads Pau Hana in light of ideas about labor emanating from the nineteenth- 
century United States, suggesting connections between Hawaii and the slaveholding 
South. He implies that Takaki’s subtitle is a nod to Ulrich B. Philips’s controversial Life 
and Labor in the Old South (1929), a connection that Takaki does not explicitly make in 
the book itself. Saxton goes on to spell out the implications. Speaking of Hawaii and the 
antebellum South, he writes:
Both were plantation colonies dominated by narrow ruling classes which enjoyed 
with respect to their labor relations monopolized access to government power. 
Both rested on single-crop, export agricultures employing racially-differentiated 
and enslaved -  or partially unfree -  labor. Takaki makes clear from the outset, 
however, that differences between these two plantation societies are no less 
significant than their similarities. Sugar culture in Hawaii was a product of the 
post-Civil War Republican era. Its founders were New England entrepreneurs 
whose economic and ideological intent had been, not to enslave, but to enlighten 
and set free: market relations and wage labor were to comprise the new 
Prometheus.10
9 Ronald Takaki, Pau Hana: Plantation Life and Labor in Hawaii, 1835-1920  (Honolulu, 1983).
10 Alexander Saxton, “The Making o f  the Hawaiian Working Class,” review o f  Pau Hana: Plantation Life 
and Labor in Hawaii, 1835-1920  by Ronald Takaki, Reviews in American History 12, no. 3 (September, 
1984), 414.
5Takaki only touches on this connection. In a short passage, William Hooper, the 
impatient master of the Koloa sugar plantation, criticized the “laziness” of his native 
Hawaiian workers in the 1840s. He points out, for example, that Hooper put the 
responsibility for making “free labor” work on his employees: because of native laziness, 
“as long as the plantation depended on native labor, the superintendent would have to be 
a ‘Slave Driver.’”11 In a single sentence, Takaki points out that Hooper saw himself as “a 
pathfinder or vanguard of civilization, introducing the system of free labor in order to 
emancipate the natives from the miserable system of ‘chief labor.’”12 After this passage, 
discussions of ideologies of freedom and slavery fade from Pau Hana. However 
tangential to Takaki’s book, Saxton’s point gets at a central point of tension in the history 
of Hawaii. This paper builds on Saxton’s insight and argues that the tension between 
freedom and slavery was central to Hawaii’s formation.
Looking more explicitly at this seeming contradiction between the stated free- 
labor values of early white settlers in Hawaii and the plantation economy they created 
demonstrates the malleability of antislavery thought. As Richard Huzzey has shown for 
the British Empire, antislavery did not end with the abolition of slavery in 1834, and 
Britain’s efforts to suppress the slave trade ultimately came to justify British colonization 
of much of the African continent.13 Antislavery ideas likewise had consequences beyond 
emancipation in Hawaii and the United States. In the more familiar context of the United 
States, the growing political importance of antislavery ideas sparked the Civil War and 
shaped the process and aftermath of emancipation. Ironically, in Hawaii many antislavery 
ideas provided convenient justifications for the appropriation of native lands and the
11 Takaki, Pau Hana, 11.
12 Takaki, Pau Hana, 6.
13 Richard Huzzey, Freedom Burning: Anti-Slavery and Empire in Victorian Britain (Ithaca, 2012).
6redeployment of Hawaiian state resources in favor of plantation labor. For example, the 
Great Mahele that The Friend extolled as a triumph of free labor was not the victory for 
free native farmers it claimed, but rather a land grab that allowed a small white minority 
to create profitable sugar cultivation. Supporters of the importation of indentured labor 
couched their arguments in antislavery language, even as they pressed for the 
introduction of unfree labor and called coolies elsewhere “slaves.”
White Hawaiian ideas about “free labor” were constantly in conversation with 
those of their mainland counterparts. These connections resurfaced as the two countries 
developed increasing economic and political ties over the course of the nineteenth 
century, which culminated in the overthrow of the Hawaiian monarchy in 1893 and 
American annexation in 1898. Antislavery and “free labor” rhetoric appeared in a range 
of contexts. The first waves of Congregationalist missionaries invoked free labor as a 
component of their civilizing mission in Hawaii. In practice, this meant both an emphasis 
on egalitarianism (in contrast to the “feudalism” of traditional Hawaiian society) and a 
desire to reshape native habits, which the missionaries considered indolent and 
inappropriate for free laborers. As haole influence increased, American ideological 
influence contributed to both the constitutional abolition of slavery and the creation of 
legal foundations for the plantation system. Despite protests from both Hawaii and the 
United States, Asian contract labor came to supply the bulk of Hawaii’s plantation 
workforce, especially after the Hawaiian-American reciprocity treaty of 1876 expanded 
the sugar economy. These protests slowed in the 1870s and 1880s, but reemerged in the 
midst of debates over American annexation in the 1890s, which looked increasingly 
probable after white elites overthrew the monarchy in an 1893 coup. By the time
7Congress set up a territorial government for Hawaii with the Hawaii Organic Act of 
1900, the terms of debate had shifted. “Free labor” and antislavery rhetoric no longer 
referred primarily to the civilizing or humanitarian mission of the early missionaries or 
the more idealistic mid-nineteenth-century antislavery politicians. Instead, these terms 
surfaced more often in the context of defending free white American workers from unfair 
unfree competition.
The early history of Hawaiian-western interactions set the stage for the rise of the 
plantation economy. Before European contact, an aristocratic kin group, the ali 7, had 
directed agricultural production through collective taxation on local communities of 
agriculturalists. A complex system of social taboos, the kapu system, lent religious 
justification to this system by accentuating the separation between nobles and 
commoners. As Edward Beechert puts it, “the system of taboos had provided the means 
by which the ali’i class was differentiated from the commoner class.”14
The market pressures that arrived with western ships after Captain James Cook’s 
arrival in 1778, however, encouraged many ali’i to redirect labor away from traditional 
taro farming toward more profitable, export-oriented activities, especially sandalwood 
collection. Although the native Kamehameha dynasty, whose founder Kamehameha I 
completed the political unification of Hawaii in 1810 using European weapons, retained 
sovereignty in the islands until 1893, Hawaii’s relatively sudden integration into the 
global economy caused major disruptions. Sandalwood, a shrub popular among Chinese 
merchants in Canton as a source of incense and a material for constructing decorative 
boxes, grew abundantly in the islands. Using his ultimate authority over Hawaiian land to 
assert a personal monopoly on the trade, Kamehameha I eagerly reassigned Hawaiian
14 Beechert, Working in Hawaii, 14.
workers away from fishing and cultivating taro (the staple crop of the Hawaiian diet) to 
gathering sandalwood. Despite his short-term windfall in trade goods from British and 
New England merchants hungry for anything to sell in China, Kamehameha had to 
rethink his priorities and scale back sandalwood collection when the resulting shortage of 
food producers triggered a famine. This temporary slowdown did not continue after the 
king’s death in 1819. His successor, Kamehameha II, allowed local chiefs to enter the 
trade without royal supervision, and the chiefs escalated production to levels that 
depleted wild sandalwood populations so much that the industry collapsed in the 1830s.15
Growing commercial connections with the wider world went well beyond the 
collection of sandalwood. Hawaii’s central location in the Pacific Ocean quickly made it 
a frequent destination on long-distance shipping routes. In their bid for American 
diplomatic recognition, Hawaiian diplomats William Richards and Timoteo Ha’alilio 
called it “the great centre of the whale fishery for most of the world.”16 Between 1820 
and 1840, Honolulu and Lahaina became two of the Pacific’s busiest whaling ports, with 
Honolulu repeatedly hosting over 100 whaling ships per year.17 Large numbers of sailors 
from the whaling fleets arrived in these towns in the midst of the political and social 
turmoil surrounding Kamehameha’s death in 1819. The result was the rampant 
prostitution that sprang up in Honolulu and Lahaina to meet the demands of the whaling 
crews. After converting to Christianity under the influence of New England missionaries, 
Hawaii’s ruling class tried in vain to stop prostitution. On at least two occasions, these
15 Ralph S. Kuykendall, “Early Hawaiian Commercial Development,” Pacific H istorical Review  3, no. 4 
(December, 1934), 365-385.
16 William Richards and Timoteo Haalilio to the Secretary o f  State [Daniel Webster], December 14, 1842, 
420.H.R. D oc.35, 5
17 Rhys Richards, “Pacific Whaling 1820 to 1840: Port Visits, ‘Shipping Arrivals and Departures’ 
Comparisons, and Sources,” The G reat Circle 24, no. 1 (2002), 27.
9tensions boiled over into violence. In 1826 sailors from the Dolphin smashed windows at 
Honolulu mission house and threatened missionary leader Hiram Bingham with clubs to 
protest a law banning prostitutes on ships. In 1827 the crew of the British whaler John 
Palmer bombarded Lahaina when the Governor of Maui arrested their captain for 
violating the same law.18 Native prostitutes were not the only laborers that the whaling 
ships demanded. Faced with frequent desertions of disgruntled crew members, whaling 
ships took on hundreds of Hawaiian sailors before 1820, and by 1850, more than 4,000 
Hawaiian men were serving on European and American ships.19
The demographic consequences of these early interactions were catastrophic. 
European and American ships brought an unfamiliar cocktail of diseases to the islands 
that killed Hawaiians at rates reminiscent of the epidemics the swept the Americas after 
1492. Like their mainland counterparts, native Hawaiians had no previous experience 
with smallpox, typhoid fever, tuberculosis, bubonic plague, influenza, dysentery, 
measles, or cholera -  all of which played a role in the dramatic population drop after 
1778.20 Unlike the native inhabitants of the Americas, they also had no previous exposure 
to syphilis, which spread quickly in the context of widespread sexual contact between 
native women and foreign sailors, and exacerbated the demographic crisis by reducing 
fertility. As Seth Archer points out, American missionaries in Hawaii lacked the 
resources to develop a medical infrastructure like the United States was beginning to 
develop to contain the effects of smallpox, and made things worse by approaching the
18 Sarah Vowell, Unfamiliar Fishes (New York, 2011), 114-116; Jennifer Fish Kashay, “Competing 
Imperialisms and Hawaiian Authority: The Cannonading o f Lahaina in 1827,” Pacific H istorical Review  
77, no. 3 (August, 2008), 369-390.
19 O.A. Bushnell, The Gifts o f  Civilization: Germs and Genocide in Hawaii (Honolulu, 1993), 211.
20 Bushnell, 29.
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problem with fatalistic detachment. “In the end,” he writes, “they laid the blame for 
Hawaiian morbidity and depopulation on Hawaiians’ own ‘licentiousness.’”21
Most estimates place the Hawaiian population on the eve of contact in 1778 
around 300,000. The first official census, conducted in 1853, counted only 71,019 native 
Hawaiians. One analysis of population counts by missionaries in the period 1823-1836 
shows a twenty percent population decline, with a 13.2% decline between 1832 and 1836 
alone. The 107,954 Hawaiians missionaries counted in 1836 suggest a death rate well 
above 50% for the first 60 years of contact with westerners. The native population 
stabilized somewhat around the mid-nineteenth century, with an annual rate of decline 
between 1% and 2% after 1853, but the remaining indigenous population of 31,019 in 
1896 points to a total drop of around 90% between contact and American annexation.22
Like the sugar planters of Trinidad and British Guiana, who used discourses of 
“labor shortage” to justify the importation of South Asian indentured workers to compete 
with a stable existing population of freed slaves, Hawaiian planters complained 
constantly about not having enough workers. Unlike their counterparts in the British 
Caribbean, who presided over a declining industry with a large pool of local labor 
available, however, Hawaii’s planters could point to the rapid expansion of their industry 
and the demographic free fall of the native population.23
In 1820, in the midst of this social turmoil, a small party of New England 
Congregationalist missionaries arrived on the Big Island in the brig Thaddeus. They
21 Seth Archer, “Remedial Agents: Missionary Physicians and the Depopulation o f  Hawai’i,” Pacific 
H istorical Review  79, no. 4 (November, 2010), 515.
22 Andrew W. Lind, H aw aii’s People  (Honolulu, 1967), 16-17; Robert C. Schmitt, Dem ographic Statistics 
o f  Hawaii, 1778-1965  (Honolulu, 1968), 74. The 1896 figure rises to 39,504 when people o f  partial native 
Hawaiian descent are included.
23 For discourses o f  “labor shortage” as a justification for indentured migration in the post-emancipation 
British Caribbean, see Kale, Fragments o f  Empire.
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arrived at almost the exact moment when the social system organized by kapus collapsed. 
In 1819, the influence of two of Kamehameha’s widows, Keapualani and Ka’ahumanu, 
had convinced the new king Kamehameha II to end the kapu system. Although scholars 
have advanced a variety of explanations for this decision -  from Ka’ahumanu’s personal 
annoyance at the gender discrimination inherent in kapu, to foreign influences, to the 
desacralizing chaos brought by the western fleets, to an adaptive response to 
depopulation -  it is difficult to dispute that the timing proved fortuitous for the 
missionaries.24
The end of the kapu system provided an opening for the missionaries, who wasted 
little time trying to fill the vacuum with American ideas of social organization. While 
they concerned themselves primarily with converting the native population, the 
missionaries also brought many of the ideas that would coalesce in the northern United 
States into what historians of the 1850s call “free labor ideology.” The missionaries 
certainly subscribed to the explicitly Protestant notions of this worldview, which Eric 
Foner identifies as the idea that labor was “a religious value, a Christian duty.” In their 
work in Hawaii, the New Englanders accordingly proceeded under the related assumption 
that, as Foner puts it, “the moral obligations which would ensure success in one’s calling 
-  honesty, frugality, diligence, punctuality, and sobriety -  became religious obligations.” 
They also shared “such basic assumptions as the value of economic individualism, the 
rights of property, and other capitalist virtues.” The crucial difference between free labor
24 S. Lee Seaton, "The Hawaiian “kapu” Abolition o f  1819,” American Ethnologist I, no. 1 (February, 
1974), 202-204; Kuykendall, The H awaiian Kingdom: Volume /, 67; Jennifer Fish Kashay, “From Kapus to 
Christianity: The Disestablishment o f  the Hawaiian Religion and Chiefly Appropriation o f  Calvinist 
Christianity,” The Western H istorical Quarterly 39, no.l (Spring, 2008), 17-39; Vowell, 54-65; Seth 
Archer, “Virgin Soil, Hawaiian Culture,” Paper presented at the Annual meeting o f  the American Historical 
Association, N ew  York, January 2, 2015.
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ideology in Hawaii and on the mainland concerned what alternative system the free labor 
system set itself up against. Foner’s observation that the “free labor outlook” offered not 
only “a model of the good society” but also provided “a yardstick forjudging other social 
systems” holds especially true in Hawaii as well.25
According to their leader Hiram Bingham, the missionaries arrived in Hawaii 
hoping “to raise the character and change the religion and habits of the nation; to reform 
and purify society there, and to found and build up institutions adapted to bless the 
current and succeeding generations.”26 Among their other activities in the islands -  
saving souls, creating a written version of the Hawaiian language, and counteracting the 
profane influences of the whaling fleets -  the missionaries sought to convince Hawaiians 
to transform themselves into what the newcomers considered productive free laborers. 
This meant undoing the legacy of the unfree, quasi-feudal labor system that had existed 
before their arrival, and changing native behavior in ways consistent with the 
missionaries’ vision of work. As Bingham put it, “the common people were accustomed 
to spend less time and effort on the soil and fisheries” since some of their time “was 
required on public plantations, or public buildings, or houses, or fences for landlords, 
governors, kings, &c. This labor was often of little value... compared with the free 
intelligent labor of enlightened communities.”27 He also described the construction of 
Kawaiaha’o Church, an impressive structure built of large blocks of coral that native 
divers cut from a nearby reef as a teaching exercise. “It was desirable” during the
25 Eric Foner, Free Soil, Free Labor, Free Men: The Ideology o f  the Republican Party before the C ivil War 
(New York, 1995), 12-13,19
26 Hiram Bingham, A Residence o f  Twenty-One Years in the Sandwich Islands, or, the Civil, Religious, and  
P  olitical H istory o f  Those Islands: Com prising a Particular View o f  the M issionary Operations Connected  
with the Introduction and Progress o f  Christianity and Civilization among the Hawaiian people  
(Canandaigua, N .Y ., 1855), 19.
27 Bingham, 570.
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construction process “that the hands of the natives should do as much of every part of the 
work as, without much neglecting other duties, they could advantageously do in 
procuring and fitting materials, and putting them in their proper place in the building. By 
this means their knowledge of masonry and carpentry was materially augmented, and 
their judgment improved, in respect to the business of life.”28
Missionaries also grumbled about the work ethic of their native laborers during 
early attempts to cultivate sugar. In 1835, with the permission of King Kamehameha III, 
a group of white missionary-businessmen leased 980 acres of royal land at Koloa on 
Kauai to found a sugar plantation. The proprietors were impatient with their native 
Hawaiian workers; co-owner William Hooper fretted that “it requires the concentrated 
patience of an hundred Jobs to get along with these natives.” The temperance-minded 
missionaries also worried that their molasses might be used in rum production. 
Nonetheless, Koloa became the first profitable sugar plantation in Hawaii.29 Reflecting in 
1844 on the missionaries’ influence in Hawaii, the journalist James Jackson Jarves 
claimed that “even the King.. .satisfied that free labor is the most profitable, has, of late, 
abolished the working days, and pays his workmen, who labor under the superintendence 
of a white man, regular wages.”30 The missionaries brought from New England not only
28 Bingham, 572.
29 In 1825, Queen Ka’ahumanu had revoked permission from a previous attempt to start a plantation at 
Manoa when she discovered its connection to rum production. Hooper him self fretted about the potential 
violation o f  his temperance principles to his colleagues, asking “Will not the M olasses which we have 
forwarded P. & B. [Peirce & Brewer] be sent home and used for distillation? Ought we not to make some 
efforts to prevent that? How our reputation would suffer if  any o f  the molasses shipped by us or through us 
should be purchased by the distillers.” Arthur C. Alexander, Koloa Plantation 1835-1935: A Historyt o f  the 
O ldest Hawaiian Sugar Plantation  (Honolulu, 1937), 10, 17; Benjamin Levy, National Register o f  Historic 
Places Inventory -  Nomination Form: Old Sugar Mill o f  Koloa (August, 1978). 
http://pdfhost.focus.nps.gOv/docs/NHLS/Text/66000296.pdf, 3.
30 James Jackson Jarves, Scenes and scenery in the Sandwich Islands, and a trip through Central America: 
being observations from  my note-book during the years 1837-1842  (Boston, 1844), 101.
14
Christianity, but also an emphasis on free labor as an avenue to individual and collective 
improvement.
In the first decades of the Congregationalist mission in Hawaii, white settlers 
remained a relatively small presence in Hawaii, but their relationship with the Hawaiian 
monarchy soon gave them outsized influence. In preparation for his plans to modernize 
the Hawaiian government, King Kamehameha III poached the missionary William 
Richards from the mission to serve as a tutor for the king and a small circle of Hawaiian 
elites in political science. In 1839, Kamehameha issued a Declaration of Rights drafted 
by one of these students, Boaz Mahune, which asserted that every man had rights to “life, 
liberty, the labor of his hands, and productions of his mind,” and prohibited “service or 
labor.. .at variance with the above sentiments.”31 This protection made its way into 
Hawaii’s first constitution, ratified the following year.
Ominously, that constitution, which established a judiciary in a country with no 
trained lawyers, allowed outsiders with a legal background to rise quickly to positions of 
power. John Ricord, a New Jersey-born lawyer who had served as personal secretary to 
Texas President Sam Houston, became Attorney General soon after his arrival in Hawaii. 
William Little Lee, a New Yorker whom Ricord convinced to stay when Lee’s ship 
stopped for repairs in Honolulu, became the first Chief Justice of the Hawaiian Supreme 
Court. Together with his fellow New Yorker, the missionary Gerritt P. Judd, and the 
native aristocrat John I’i, Justice Lee drafted the Hawaiian constitution of 1852.
This constitution was unequivocally antislavery. It pronounced that “slavery shall, 
under no circumstances whatever, be tolerated in the Hawaiian Islands: whenever a slave 
shall enter Hawaiian territory he shall be free.” The constitution did not define slavery.
31 Quoted in Kuykendall, The Hawaiian Kingdom, Volume II, 160.
The second half of the antislavery clause, however, suggested that its authors were 
concerned more with the importation of chattel slaves than with the enslavement on 
native Hawaiians. It stipulated that “no person who imports a slave, or slaves, into the 
King’s dominions shall ever enjoy any civil or political rights in this realm.”32 In her 
1962 examination of the 1854-1855 debates over American annexation of Hawaii, Merze 
Tate suggests that annexation proposals failed in the 1850s because Hawaiians did not 
want Hawaii to become the next Bleeding Kansas. While her evidence is vague -  she 
relies on the hostility toward Stephen Douglas that an American Commissioner in 
Honolulu perceived in elite Hawaiian circles -  the non-importation clause certainly fits 
with her argument.33
Paradoxically, the political fruits of white influence appeared not only in the 
official abolition of slavery, but also in laws that laid the foundation for the rise of sugar 
plantation agriculture. The Oregon Treaty of 1846, American victory in the Mexican 
War, which extended the boundaries of the United States to the Pacific Ocean, and 
especially the California gold rush that began in 1848, all opened new possibilities for 
sugar export to the United States. Under pressure from haole advisers, the king enacted a 
series of laws which made large scale plantation agriculture possible. The “Great 
Mahele” of 1848 transformed Hawaiian lands into commodities, creating an opening for 
white ownership of large swaths of Hawaii. The subsequent Kuleana Act of 1850 allowed 
commoners to apply for fee-simple ownership of lands they had customarily cultivated,
32 Vowell, 159; Norman Meller, “Missionaries to Hawaii: Shapers o f  the Islands’ Government,” The 
Western Political Quarterly 11, no. 4 (December, 1958), 792-793; Constitution and Laws o f  His M ajesty 
Kamehameha III, K ing o f  the Hawaiian Islands, P assed by the N obles and Representatives at their 
Sessions, 1852. (Honolulu, 1852), 4.
33 Merze Tate, “Slavery and Racism as Deterrents to the Annexation o f  Hawaii, 1854-1855,” The Journal 
o f  Negro H istory  47, no. 1 (January, 1962), 6.
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but created a complex and burdensome process with a short application window. To 
make matters worse, it passed one month after a law allowing foreign land ownership, 
which well-connected white settlers quickly exploited.34 In the founding meeting of the 
/ztfo/e-dominated Royal Hawaiian Agricultural Society in 1850, a circular letter 
celebrated the fact that “the native government... impelled by the irresistible influence 
and example of the Anglo Saxon energy and progress, which it sees in every direction, is 
relaxing its former tenacious grasp on the arable lands of the Islands, and even inviting 
and encouraging their cultivation by foreign skill and capital.”35
The interests of the Royal Hawaiian Agricultural Society, which would later 
merge into the powerful Hawaiian Sugar Planters Association, appeared in labor 
legislation as well as land legislation. William Little Lee, who would soon be Chief 
Justice of Hawaii, drafted a “Masters and Servants Act,” which he submitted to the 
Agricultural Society for approval on April 29, 1850 before formally proposing it to the 
king. Much like labor laws in effect in Britain’s sugar-producing colonies in the post­
emancipation period, the law involved the state in the discipline of contract laborers. It 
allowed masters to apply to local law enforcement for arrest warrants on absconding 
laborers, and permitted these masters to extend fugitives’ contracts for double the time of
their absence, up to one additional year. It also allowed masters to call on the police to
\
arrest their workers when they failed, in the master’s opinion, to serve in accordance with 
their contract, and to have these workers imprisoned at hard labor until they agreed to 
serve out the remainder of their contract. Finally, the law nodded to the possibility of
34 Sally Engle Merry, Colonizing H aw ai’i: The Cultural Power o f  Law  (Princeton, 2000), 93-95; Jon M. 
Van Dyke, Who Owns the Crown Lands o f  H aw ai’i? (Honolulu, 2008), 39-51.
35 The Transactions o f  the Royal Hawaiian Agricultural Society: Including a Record o f  the Proceedings 
Prelim inary to the Formation o f  the Society, in August, 1850 I, no. 1 (Honolulu, 1850), 7.
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importing laborers from abroad by extending the maximum contract period -  five years 
for Hawaiians -  to ten years for contracts made outside the islands.36 An 1860 
amendment to the provision on fugitives strengthened penalties by requiring recaptured 
workers to provide three months of hard labor for the state in addition to the extensions 
on service to their master.37 One study of criminal cases in Hilo shows that twenty-three 
percent of criminal cases involving Hawaiian defendants in 1863 were for work-related 
offenses under the Masters and Servants Act. For defendants of all nationalities, work- 
related offenses represented forty percent of all cases in 1873 and 37.7% of cases in 
1883.38
In 1852, the same year that the Hawaiian constitution both forbade slavery and 
imposed penalties on the importers of slaves, the first shipload of indentured Chinese 
workers arrived to work under the legal regime of the Masters and Servants Act. John 
Cass, a London ship captain already transporting Chinese migrants to San Francisco, 
agreed to a contract with the Agricultural Society to bring 200 indentured Chinese 
workers to Hawaii. On January 3, 1852, he returned with 195 migrants from Amoy 
(modem Xiamen) aboard the Thetis?9 Sources from the 1850s differ on the conditions 
these workers faced upon arrival in Hawaii. The missionary-run official government 
newspaper, The Polynesian, claimed in July that “as the wages are not promised merely,
36 “An Act for the Government o f  Masters and Servants,” June 21, 1850, in Penal Code o f  the Hawaiian  
Islands, Passed by the House o f  Nobles and Representatives on the 21s' o f  June, A.D. 1850; to which are 
A ppended the Other Acts P assed by the House o f  Nobles and Representatives during their General Session 
fo r  1850  (Honolulu, 1850), 170-176.
37 Katharine Coman, The H istory o f  Contract Labor in the Hawaiian Islands (New York, 1903), 493. 
Wilma Sur, “Hawai’i ’s Masters and Servants Act: Brutal Slavery?” University o f  Hawaii Law Review  31, 
no. 1 (Winter, 2008), 89-91
38 Merry, Colonizing Hawaii, 150-151, 171, Appendix B [n.p.].
39 Clarence E. Glick, Sojourners and Settlers: Chinese Migrants in Hawaii (Honolulu, 1980), 6-7; Clarence 
E. Glick, “The Voyage o f  the ‘Thetis’ and the First Chinese Contract Laborers Brought to Hawaii,” 
H awaiian Journal o f  History 9 (1975), 135-139; Tin-Yuke and Wai Jane Char, “The First Chinese Contract 
Laborers in Hawaii, 1852,” Hawaiian Journal o f  History 9 (1975), 128-134.
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but paid, and the coolies are well treated, they are not only content, but have urged their 
friends at home to join them.”40 On the other hand, in an 1854 speech to the Agricultural 
Society, Prince Liholiho, in a speech praising the importation of Chinese field hands, 
casually mentioned that the indentured Chinese had “a considerable disposition to hang 
themselves.”41 A missionary, William Speer, in emphasizing the civilizing influence of 
Christianity on the workers, described them as “a turbulent, stubborn, reckless class 
sometimes resisting overseers or employers, threatening to kill them or commit suicide... 
Some of the whites treat them harshly, but generally Christians exhibit anxiety to deal 
with them justly.”42 Whatever the fate of the migrants from the Thetis, during the 1850s 
only a handful of additional indentured Chinese workers arrived in Hawaii.43
The 1860s marked a tipping point in Hawaii’s commercial integration with the 
United States. Ballooning wartime demand for sugar in the United States, especially in 
the midst of the disruption of the Louisiana sugar industry, raised prices high enough that 
Hawaiian sugar became profitable in the American market despite steep tariffs. Between 
1860 and 1865, the volume of Hawaiian sugar exports grew more than tenfold, from less 
than 1.5 million pounds in 1860 to more than 15 million pounds in 1865 44 Westerners 
already in Hawaii, including the missionaries themselves, were well-placed to take 
advantage of the boom. Amos Starr Cooke, who had run the mission school that educated
40 The Polynesian, July 24, 1852, 42.
41 Prince Liholiho, “Report on Labor and Population,” in Transactions o f  the Royal Hawaiian Agricultural 
Society: A t Its Fourth Annual Meeting, in June, 1854 2, no. 1 (Honolulu, 1854), 103.
42 William Speer to Walter Lowrie, May 2, 1856, quoted in Char and Char, 131. Scholars o f  other societies 
that imported indentured labor in the nineteenth century have found striking suicide rates among indentured 
workers. Lisa Yun finds that Chinese indentured workers in Cuba in the 1850s had a suicide rate more than 
ten times as high as Africans, and nearly one hundred times higher than whites. In the early twentieth 
century, Hugh Tinker points to a suicide rate o f  780 per million among Indians in Fiji and 640 per million 
among Indians in Natal, compared to 46-54 per million in India. See Lisa Yun, The Coolie Speaks: Chinese 
Indentured Laborers and African Slaves in Cuba (Philadelphia 2008), 84; Hugh Tinker, A New System o f  
Slavery: The Export o f  Indian Labour Overseas 1830-1920  (London, 1974), 201.
43 Glick, Sojourners and Settlers, 10.
44 Kuykendall, The Hawaiian Kingdom, Volume II, 141.
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the royal children, had partnered with the mission supply agent, Samuel N. Castle to form
i
a trading company in 1851. They had originally intended only to create an alternative 
avenue to supplying the mission, since shipments from their superiors in Boston were 
infrequent. During the Civil War, however, Castle & Cooke entered the sugar business, 
which laid the foundations of their later growth into one of Hawaii’s “Big Five” sugar 
companies. Another “Big Five” company, Alexander & Baldwin, also had roots in two 
missionary families who seized the opportunities offered by the war to become sugar 
merchants. Castle, Cooke, Alexander, and Baldwin joined with a handful of American 
and European merchants to form the core of Hawaii’s planter class.
The rise of the sugar industry fueled debates over the appropriate type of labor for 
the plantations. During and immediately after the American Civil War, debates over how 
to correctly describe Hawaii’s labor system frequently hinged on how to define the term 
“coolie.” As Moon-Ho Jung observes, “coolies were never a people or a legal category. 
Rather, coolies were a conglomeration of racial imaginings that emerged worldwide in 
the era of slave emancipation, a product of the imaginers rather than the imagined... in a 
nation struggling to define slavery and freedom, coolies seemed to fall under neither yet 
both; they were viewed as a natural advancement from chattel slavery and a means to 
maintain slavery’s worst features.”45 The law Congress passed “to prohibit the ‘Coolie 
trade’” in February 1862 reflected this inherent vagueness in its definition of the term. It 
forbade American ships from transporting “the inhabitants or subjects of China, known as 
‘coolies,’ to be transported to any foreign country, port, or place whatever, to be disposed 
of, sold, or transferred, for any term of years or for any time whatever, as servants or
45 Moon-Ho Jung, Coolies and Cane: Race, Labor, and Sugar in the Age o f  Emancipation  (Baltimore, 
2006),
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apprentices, or to be held for service or labor.” It exempted from the ban “any free and 
voluntary emigration of any Chinese subject.”46 While this definition seemed to indicate 
clearly enough that “coolies” were specifically Chinese, its inclusion of the clause about 
free and voluntary emigrations suggested that not all Chinese were coolies. On the other 
hand, the fuzzy line between being “held for service of labor” and practicing “free and 
voluntary emigration” opened the possibility that any migrant from China might be a 
coolie. Andrew Gyory has pointed out that “the vagueness of the language eviscerated the 
‘anti-coolie’ act of 1862,” and that “although Americans opposed to the importation of 
Chinese frequently cited the law, it was virtually a dead letter from the day it passed.”47 
Increasing trade intensified demands from Hawaii’s haole elite for labor, and 
specifically for Hawaiian government subsidies for the importation of field hands. In 
1864, two years after Congress passed the law banning the importation of coolies (which 
the law defined as specifically Chinese), the Kingdom of Hawaii set up a Board of 
Immigration to seek out foreign laborers and import them for plantation work. Through 
appropriations from the Hawaiian treasury to pay recruitment costs, the Board of 
Immigration, much like the Masters and Servants Act, enlisted the resources of the 
Hawaiian state to serve the interests of sugar planters.48 The first agent of the Board of 
Immigration to reach China, the German-born botanist William Hillebrand, received an 
extra stipend from the Royal Hawaiian Agricultural Society, both to assist his recruitment 
efforts and to allow him to collect “seeds, shrubs, plants, and animals” for commercial
46 “An Act to prohibit the ‘Coolie Trade’ by American Citizens in American V essels,” February 19, 1862. 
12 Stat. 340, Chapter XXVII.
47 Andrew Gyory, Closing the Gate: Race, Politics, and the Chinese Exclusion Act (Chapel Hill, 1998), 33.
48 “An Act to Provide for the Importation o f  Laborers, and for the Encouragement o f  Immigration,” in 
“Laws o f  the Hawaiian Islands: Session o f  1864.” Pacific Commercial Advertiser, January 21, 1865, 4.
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use in Hawaii.49 By the summer of 1864, the Hillebrand and the Board began publishing 
ads soliciting requests for coolies.50 One of these, published in the Pacific Commercial 
Advertiser and the Hawaiian Gazette in 1865, assured readers that the importation 
process could avoid abuses under the aegis of the state. “Whatever the disrepute and 
odium attached to the Coolie trade in China, when conducted by private speculators may 
be,” wrote future king David Kalakaua, “the case seems to be very different whenever it 
is known that the business in in the hands and under the contract of a Government.”51 In 
making this argument, Kalakaua echoed British officials who in 1842 had made the 
imperial government itself responsible for the importation of indentured workers to 
British colonies. The Hawaiian government seems to have believed, like Mauritius 
Colonial Secretary G.F. Dick, that well-intentioned government involvement could 
“obtain for the laborers most ample protection.”52
Despite these assurances, by the time serious discussion on proposals to lower 
American tariffs on Hawaiian sugar began in 1867, a small but growing number of 
Hawaiians and Americans had raised the possibility that Hawaii used a form of unfree 
labor. It was probably no coincidence that a new Hawaiian constitution ratified in 1864 
toned down its antislavery clause, removing the provision that had imposed penalties on 
the importers of slaves.
The Board of Immigration continued recruitment efforts after 1865, but the slump 
in sugar exports after the end of the Civil War encouraged the planter class and the 
Hawaiian government to seek changes in Hawaii’s relationship to the United States. The
49 “Planter’s Society,” Pacific Com mercial Advertiser, April 8, 1865, 2.
50 “Notice to Planters and Others Interested in the Importation o f  Laborers,” Pacific Commercial 
Advertiser, VIII, no. 50, June 11, 1864, 3.
51 “From the Gazette. By Authority.” Pacific Com mercial Advertiser, July 29, 1865, 4.
52 Tinker, A N ew System o f  Slavery, 75.
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Hawaiians convinced the American minister in Honolulu, Edward McCook, to propose a 
“reciprocity” treaty with the United States, which would allow Hawaiian sugar to enter 
the United States duty-free. Thanks to McCook’s lobbying, the proposed treaty, formally 
introduced in the Senate in 1867, received more attention than similar proposals, 
including support from Secretary of State Seward and President Johnson, but it fell by the 
wayside in the midst of Johnson’s impeachment. By 1870, when the Senate finally 
rejected the treaty, sugar exports were growing again, and the Board of Immigration was 
expanding its search for labor beyond China.53
Even as late as Reconstruction, some white Hawaiians still felt that they had 
something to teach American about emancipation. One of these, the Massachusetts 
missionary and temperance activist Samuel C. Damon, edited the Honolulu newspaper 
The Friend. On March 1, 1866, The Friend reviewed the consequences of three recent 
emancipations around the world. The Friend that the emancipation of Russian serfs in 
1861 had not only removed barriers to mobility and marriage, but had also enfranchised 
the freed peasants to vote in local elections and granted them some property rights and 
legal due process. In Hawaii itself, The Friend labeled the Great Mahele as “the 
emancipation of the people” and “the transition from the old to the new order of things.” 
Ignoring the dispossession of native Hawaiians, Damon pronounced that “the poor 
kanaka may now stand on the border of his little kalo [taro] patch and, holding his fee 
simple patent in his hand, bid defiance to the world!” Just months after the Thirteenth 
Amendment, America needed to follow Hawaii’s lead and institute land reform in the 
South. After 1848, “it was taken for granted [in Hawaii] that the tiller or cultivator of the
53 Kuykendall, The H awaiian Kingdom, Volume II, 141; John Patterson, “The United States and Hawaiian 
Reciprocity, 1867-1870,” Pacific H istorical Review  7, no. 1 (March, 1938), 14-26.
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soil had a right to own the land which he cultivated... This is just the point which, we 
fear, has been over-looked in the emancipation of the slaves in the United States.”54
While no Congressman or Senator seems to have mentioned the issue of coolies 
in Hawaii in the context of the first proposals for a United States-Hawaii reciprocity 
treaty in 1867, Congress did make a statement relevant to the issue in the same year.55 
The Senate -  dominated by Radical Republicans after the 1866 midterm elections -  
passed a resolution condemning the coolie trade on January 16. It declared that “the 
traffic in laborers transported from China and other eastern countries [emphasis added], 
known as the coolie trade, is odious to the people of the United States as inhuman and 
immoral.” Placing the coolie trade in relation to African slavery, the resolution declared it 
“abhorrent to the spirit of modem international law and policy, which have substantially 
extirpated the African slave trade,” which the coolie trade differed from “in little else 
than the employment of fraud instead of force to make its victims captive.” Building on 
the 1862 Anti-Coolie Law, the Senate declared “preventing the further introduction of 
coolies into this hemisphere, or the adjacent islands” [emphasis added] to be “the duty of 
this government.”56
This resolution probably arose from concerns unconnected to Hawaii specifically. 
As Moon-Ho Jung points out, the resolution originated with Nathaniel P. Banks, the 
former Union commander in New Orleans and shaper of Reconstruction policies in 
Louisiana, which links the statement more closely with the coolie trade in Cuba and
54 “Hawaii, Russia, America,” The Friend, March 1, 1866; Jocelyn Linnekin, “The Hui Lands o f  Keanae: 
Hawaiian Land Tenure and the Great Mahele,” The Journal o f  the Polynesian Society 92, no. 2 (June, 
1983), 169-188.
55 Patterson, “The United States and Hawaiian Reciprocity, 1867-1870,” 14-26; “Papers having Reference 
to the Reciprocity Treaty Lately Negotiated between the Governments o f  the United States and the 
Hawaiian Islands,” December 17, 1867. Exec Doc. F. 40-2-6, 129-147.
56 William H. Seward, “Circular Relative to the Coolie Trade,” January 17, 1867 
. Exec. Doc 80-2.
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Louisiana.57 The language of the resolution, however, made additions to the language of 
the 1862 law -  notably its mention of “other eastern countries” and “adjacent islands” -  
that would make it directly relevant to Hawaii. Like the 1862 law, it also demonstrated a 
sharp divergence between how the United States Congress and Hawaii’s influential 
haoles, who had so recently crafted the Masters and Servants Act and the Board of 
Immigration, understood the boundaries of “free labor.”
The year after the Senate issued this objection to the coolie trade, the American 
officials had a reason to consider applying it to Hawaii. The collapse of the Tokugawa 
shogunate in the Meiji Restoration of 1868 loosened long-standing Japanese restrictions 
on emigration.58 Eugene Van Reed, an American businessman whom the Hawaiian 
government had appointed its consul general in Japan, did not wait for the negotiation of 
a formal treaty to move forward with the importation of plantation workers. According to 
a complaint submitted to the American minister R.B. Van Valkenburgh by the Japanese 
diplomats Hizen Fijio and Higashi Kuze Fijio, Van Reed had petitioned them to grant 
passports to 350 Japanese subjects allowing them to travel to Hawaii for plantation work. 
When the Japanese officials hesitated, insisting on allowing treaty negotiations to 
proceed, the British ship Scioto abruptly sailed away with many of the workers on board. 
In response Van Valkenburgh issued an order on May 29 extending the 1862 law to 
include Japan, and applied to William Seward for a copy of the 1867 resolution to 
support his position. Seward advised Van Valkenburgh that his actions were illegal, but 
forwarded the resolution anyway, and referred the issue to the Senate Foreign Relations
57 Jung, Coolies and Cane, 80.
58 Dennis M. Ogawa, Kodom o no tami ni: For the Sake o f  the Children: The Japanese-American  
Experience in Hawaii (Honolulu, 1978), 3.
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Committee.59 There is no evidence that Congress seriously considered either Van 
Valkenburgh’s complaint or a reciprocity treaty in 1867. Van Valkenburgh’s amendment 
during the Scioto incident had, after all, gone beyond the original 1862 legislation, which 
had defined coolies as Chinese. Reports of the migrants’ mistreatment brought a 
delegation of Japanese officials to Hawaii to protest and investigate. The passengers who 
had been spirited away on the Scioto largely stayed in Hawaii, however; of the 148 
workers transported on that ship, only 13 returned to Japan.60
The Scioto arrived in the midst of and contributed to a vigorous newspaper debate 
within Hawaii over the definition and desirability of coolie labor. Henry Martyn Whitney, 
a friend of Mark Twain, used his role as the editor of the Pacific Commercial Advertiser 
to advance a sustained critique of the emerging coolie labor system in the 1860s. Whitney 
often highlighted instances where specific aspects of the coolie experience seemed to 
contradict their classification as “free labor.” For example, Whitney provided detailed 
coverage of an 1867 court case In Re C.H. Lewers and Pakalo Chow, concerning the 
applicability of tax laws to coolies. The worker, Pakalo Chow, protested that the Board of 
Immigration had told him nothing about having to pay taxes. His employer, Lewers, 
likewise protested that requiring coolies to work for the state to pay off taxes abridged the 
contractual rights of employers, who had made contracts on the understanding that they 
would have exclusive access to the labor of coolies during the period of their contract.
The government responded by asserting that coolies “were men, not slaves, neither could 
a contract like the one in question be construed as reducing any man to a condition of
59 “Message o f  the President o f  the United States, Communicating Correspondence between the Secretary 
o f  State and the minister resident o f  the United States in Japan, showing the importance o f  an amendment 
to the law o f  the United States prohibiting the coolie trade.” July 20, 1868. 1317 S. Exec Doc. 80.
60 Kuykendall, The Hawaiian Kingdom, Volume It, 183-184.
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slavery. These Chinamen were not chattels, but human beings, and they must be treated 
as such,” taxes and all.61 When the court ruled in favor of the state and required the 
payment of taxation, the Advertiser declared that the discrepancy between this 
affirmation of coolies’ free status and their frustrating reality would only put planters and 
workers at odds. “The laborer complains with reason,” it wrote, “that he has been 
deceived... and may yet give trouble. The planter has to live in a constant state of 
watchful precaution for the protection of life and property.”62
Four years after the kingdom’s influential Scottish-born foreign minister Robert 
Crichton Wyllie died in 1865, Whitney pointed out the fate of the coolies at Princeville, 
Wyllie’s Kauai sugar plantation. Not long after the Hawaiian government interred Wyllie 
in the Royal Mausoleum, an honor rarely ever granted to non-royals, Whitney raised 
questions about the validity of the contracts that bound Wyllie’s workers to Princeville. 
These contracts, which allowed the executors of Wyllie’s will to reassign workers to new 
masters, had yet to expire. Whitney pointed out the seeming violation of Hawaiian law, 
which declared that “no contract of service shall bind the servant after the death of the 
master.” The Advertiser stopped short of using the transferability of the workers to 
explicitly label them as “slaves.” It did, however, suggest that the creators of these 
contracts knew the laws “and defiantly determined to trample them under foot, as was the 
[stridently antislavery] Constitution of 1852.”63
Whitney had offered a more detailed critique of the specific unfree characteristics 
of coolie labor in the wake of the Scioto controversy. On their arrival in Honolulu, he
61 “Saturday, March 2. Taxation o f  the C oolies,” Pacific Commercial Advertiser  XI, no. 35, March 2, 1867, 
3.
62 “Coolie Taxation,” Pacific Com m ercial A dvertiser XI, no. 36, March 9, 1867, 2.
63 “An Explanation,” Pacific Com m ercial A dvertiser  XIII, no. 38, March 20, 1869, 2.
alleged that coolies were “to all intents and purposes.. .regarded as a ‘chattel.’” Much like 
slaves in a slave market, the most recent Chinese arrivals had been “marched to the 
premises near the Custom-house, and confined within the yard, and a guard of soldiers 
placed over them.” Planters visiting the yard had the right to choose which coolies they 
desired for their plantations, while the coolies had no say in where they went. Whitney 
claimed that a reporter with the Advertiser had boarded the British bark Eastfleld, 
observed coolies chained by the hands and feet to a rail, and interviewed an officer who 
said that shipboard discipline “would shock ‘the nerves of humanitarians and arouse their 
sensibilities.’” In a broader sense, the Advertiser charged that the coolie system 
encouraged the growth of a separate legal system for the workers, reminiscent of slave 
codes in the American South. A society with a free labor, it explained, would not need 
special provisions like Hawaii’s 1868 labor law, which allowed ministers to devise “such 
rules and regulations as may be deemed necessary for the good government and control 
of immigrants that have been brought... as servants or laborers.”64 Even if indentured 
Asian laborers ostensibly arrived under voluntary contracts, their experience hardly 
resembled free labor.
Moon-Ho Jung argues that “the perceived existence of coolieism and other forms 
of bondage—and the moral imperative to prohibit slavery—infected and rationalized U.S. 
expansionism abroad, from China and Cuba in the 1850s to the Philippines in the 
1890s.”65 While this assessment may work in those instances, the newspaper debates 
within Hawaii during the 1860s instead unfolded under the assumption that the presence 
of “coolie labor” (if that was the correct description) would deter the United States from
64 “Bonded Laborers — The Coolie System,” Pacific Com mercial Advertiser  XIII, no. 10, 2.
65 Moon-Ho Jung, “Outlawing Coolies”: Race, Nation, and Empire in the Age o f  Emancipation,” American  
Quarterly 57, no. 3 (September, 2005), 698.
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greater entanglements with the islands. Soon after the United States registered its 
displeasure at the Scioto's transportation of Japanese workers in 1868, the Pacific 
Commercial Advertiser made these concerns explicit. Referring to a series of articles in 
favor of importing contract laborers in the Hawaiian Gazette, the Advertiser claimed they 
had “been written for the sole purpose of misleading foreign communities or 
individuals.” Specifically, “it is the belief of many that the coolie system stands in the 
way of the Reciprocity Treaty, and that it has been used by the opponents of the Treaty 
abroad against the Government.”66
Whitney was right to see the American government as mostly hostile to the coolie 
trade. He probably overstated the extent to which Americans saw the possibility of 
coolie-based plantation agriculture in Hawaii as either immoral or contrary to increased 
commercial activity between the two countries. In the midst of planter pressure to create 
the Board of Immigration, the San Francisco business magazine Mercantile Gazette and 
Prices Current urged the Hawaiian government to move forward with the importation of 
coolies. The Gazette's argument acknowledged that certain versions of coolie labor 
resembled slavery, but insisted that this was not the case for Hawaii. If anything, the 
persistence of the trade under deadly conditions was evidence of its cost-effectiveness: 
“If Coolie'labor can be profitably carried round the Cape of Good Hope to Cuba, a 
passage, when made in winter, equal in its horrors and excessive mortality to the awful 
middle passage of the slaves, it would seem unwise and suicidal to exclude it from 
Hawaii whenever the extent of the plantations shall create a pressing want for it.” 
Addressing humanitarian objections, the correspondent drew a firm line between 
Hawaiian indentured labor and slavery: “to call it slavery and talk of the horrors of the
Saturday, September 5. Bonded Laborers - The Coolie System,” Pacific Com mercial Advertiser
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passage to Hawaii is all cant. The Coolie works out his passage money and is free ever 
after -  apprentices do as much; and are not slaves; the passage from China to Honolulu is 
as pleasant as any voyage in the world, and when the poor fellow gets there, his lot is 
Paradise compared to life at home”67
Hawaii began importing coolies relatively late in comparison with Latin America, 
Mauritius, and the British Empire, which used large numbers of Asian indentured 
laborers relatively soon after abolishing slavery in 18 3 4.68 This meant that debates over 
what it meant to import coolies into Hawaii had comparisons to draw on, both for 
examples to follow and for cautionary tales of coolie importation gone wrong. Even 
before large-scale Asian labor migration into Hawaii, newspapers on the mainland and in 
the islands had carried stories about the coolie trade. In 1854, The Friend reported 
favorably on the use of Chinese coolies in the construction of a railroad across Panama, 
saying that “the coolies, after a few months, become steady, temperate, and industrious 
workmen.”69 One reprint of the Austrian traveler Ida Pfeiffer’s account of the sugar 
economy in Mauritius came with the optimistic caption, “With plenty of laborers, there is 
no reason why some of our estates -  such as the Princeville, the Haiku, and Makee -  
might not produce 3,000,000 pounds or 1500 tons annually, as easily as those instanced 
by Madame Pfeiffer.”70 Noting the permission that Tahiti and Martinique had granted for
the importation of coolies in 1864, the Pacific Commercial Advertiser, before it opposed
v
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the coolie trade, impatiently complained that “the government of those Islands has acted 
with more promptness than ours to supply the growing scarcity of laborers.”71
Newspaper pieces praising the economic benefits of coolie labor coexisted with 
lurid accounts of abuse and disaster. The Pacific Commercial Advertiser, for example, 
ran a story in 1857 on the Dutch ship Banca, a coolie trade ship bound from Macau to 
Havana, which had experienced a revolt by the migrants that resulted in a fire and 
explosion in Macau, killing nearly everyone aboard.72 The Hawaiian Gazette recounted 
the misfortunes of another ship, the Dolores Ugarte, which transported coolies from 
Macau to the Peruvian port of Callao in 1870. A disease outbreak in the middle of the 
Pacific led several of the workers to jump overboard rather than remain in the hold. As 
food and water ran low, the crew stripped their passengers of what little money they had 
by selling them cups of water. By the time the ship reached Peru, the Gazette's account 
ran, the Dolores Ugarte had lost 270 of its original 608 passengers. Returning to Macau 
the following year, the ship was destroyed by fire in the harbor, taking 600 coolies 
trapped in the hold with it.73
The variety of information circulating about coolie labor around the world 
allowed defenders of the institution to attribute abuses to a handful of bad actors, rather 
than systemic problems. When a whaling crew brought news in 1863 that a Peruvian ship 
had transported Marquesas Islanders to mine the guano deposits of the Chincha Islands, 
the Pacific Commercial Advertiser had sharp criticism to offer. “It is simply a 
continuation of the Chinese coolie slave trade,” the editors wrote, which “very naturally
71 “From Tahiti,” Pacific Com mercial Advertiser VIII, no. 53, July 2, 1864, 2.
72 “The Horrors o f  the Coolie Trade,” Pacific Com mercial Advertiser I, no. 27 (supplement), January 1, 
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excites public indignation, and it becomes the powers of Europe to take such steps as may 
put an end to it, if its character is as odious as has been represented.” The very same 
article, however, offered a much more credulous interpretation of the labor recruitment 
activities of a missionary ship, the Morning Star, in Micronesia. Pointing out that “the 
system of importing voluntary laborers has been practiced in every country and in every 
age,” the article concluded that “there can be no objection to it, when the terms are 
distinctly and openly stated, and faithfully adhered to by each party,” and even hoped that 
“it will result in social benefit to the laborers engaged, as the change of domicil [sic] will 
tend to civilize them and their children.” Printing in full the labor contract provided by 
the Morning Star's captain as evidence of his good intentions, the Advertiser regretted 
only that the mission might distract from the ship’s original purpose -  spreading the 
gospel.74
A similar differentiation appeared in the response of the Hawaiian government’s 
official newspaper, the Hawaiian Gazette, to the Scioto's 1868 transportation of Japanese 
workers. Defending Eugene Van Reed’s actions in having these migrants spirited away 
without permission, the Gazette acknowledged that coolies elsewhere were slaves in 
many cases. “The transportation of this class of laborers from India and China to Cuba, 
Peru, and other foreign countries,” it admitted, had “been attended with great cruelty.” 
The process the Gazette described began in “opium and gambling houses” where 
European ship captains duped “those overcome with stupor” to emigrate to places where 
“they were sold to the highest bidder, who thenceforth treated them as slaves,” and kept
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them that way through debt peonage. The Scioto voyage was something quite different. 
“These people well understood the conditions of the contract into which they had 
entered,” and “went voluntarily away.”75
The Scioto incident nonetheless soured the Japanese government on the prospect 
of allowing further emigration to Hawaii for almost twenty years. Although the 
Hawaiian-Japanese treaty of 1871 in theory opened the door to this migration, Japanese 
authorities generally declined to approve departures for Hawaii.76 Workers from China 
continued to arrive in the 1870s, but the Hawaiian government stepped up its overseas 
recruitment in the mid-1870s and funded commissioners to investigate new sources of 
workers. William Hillebrand, the same German botanist who had traveled to China to 
recruit labor in 1864, wrote to the Hawaiian government in 1876 from Madeira, arguing 
that Portugal’s Atlantic sugar islands offered an ideal workforce for Hawaii. The 
Hawaiian government reinstated him as an immigration commissioner, and a small 
stream of field hands trickled from Madeira and the Azores to Hawaii with government 
subsidies until 1888.77 The Board of Immigration also increased the resources it devoted 
to recruitment in the South Pacific islands, which brought 2,500 workers to the sugar 
plantations before it ended under pressure from local missionaries and the British 
commissioner in Honolulu, James Hay Wodehouse. British pressure had the same effect 
on Hawaiian plans to import workers from British India, which Hawaiian officials ruled 
out once it became clear that this would require vetting from an official “protector of
75 “Japanese for Hawaii,” H awaiian G azette IV, no. 39, October 14, 1868, 2.
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immigrants” approved by the British.78 Finally, private Hawaiian companies investigated 
the possibility of recruiting northern Europeans, bringing hundreds of Norwegians and 
more than 1,300 Germans in the early 1880s.79
These experiments in subsidized labor importation raised questions of resource 
allocation that had preoccupied Hawaii’s planters since the creation of the Board of 
Immigration in 1864. If the Hawaiian government was going to devote funds to finding 
plantation laborers, where in the world should it look? The conflation of “unfree” status 
and nonwhite racial identity inherent in the term “coolie” led to proposals to recruit 
European agricultural workers, based on the assumption that only they could make ideal 
free laborers. Whether these ideas were intended as serious blueprints for policy, or 
whether they were a rhetorical device designed to paint opponents as supporters of unfree 
labor, they point to an ideological climate deeply suspicious of Asian laborers. A letter to 
the editor of the Pacific Commercial Advertiser, for example, claimed in 1860 that 
Hawaii’s pleasant weather could allow independent white farmers to flourish in Hawaii’s 
sugar industry. “These islands are so much blessed with a salubrious and favorable 
climate, that the white man is enabled, without detriment to health and constitution, to 
produce all those articles which in other countries can only be produced by the labor of 
the African race.” The column framed the issue not only in terms of competition between 
free and unfree labor systems, but also in light of the national survival of a kingdom in 
the midst of demographic crisis: “the only alternative left to the country is, either ‘a free 
nation and a free people derived from encouraged immigration, or annexation and
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slavery.’” Although the correspondent claimed that “it is small farmers that we want,” the 
letter imagined these “small” white farmers as employers and civilizational tutors for 
native Hawaiians. Far from making Hawaiians unfree laborers, such an arrangement 
would inculcate free labor values into the Hawaiian population. “By regulating their labor 
to certain hours, prohibiting idling at working time,” the argument went, “one of the 
greatest wants in native character is supplied -  order.”80
Racially inflected calls for European immigration reappeared during negotiations 
over a proposed reciprocity treaty in 1867. Henry Martyn Whitney’s condemnation of 
coolie labor on antislavery grounds overlapped with a racist worldview that conflated the 
eligibility to be a “free” laborer with racial status. “The one race above all others that 
recommends itself to us for the requisite qualities of intelligence, plodding industry and 
thrift,” he editorialized, “is the German.” Whitney did not entirely abandon the stated 
belief of the early missionaries that civilized habits could provide an example that could 
enlighten previously benighted peoples. After all, the ultimate goal of bringing workers 
was that the native Hawaiians “be aided in their upward struggle to civilization and 
enlightenment” by ensuring that “under the busy untiring hands of human industry” a 
“useless wilderness...is enhanced and improved, her useful is developed.” The 
civilizational hierarchy behind Whitney’s preference for Europeans, however, offered a 
vision of labor habits that was so immutable as to be racial rather than cultural. It was 
better to pay the higher transportation costs for Germans, he suggested, “instead of 
seeking [laborers] among the barbarous and pagan idolators of Asia, who are incapable of
80 “Legislating for Agriculture,” Pacific Com m ercial Advertiser IV, no. 57, June 28, 1860, 2.
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Christian civilization and never will assimilate or amalgamate with either the Hawaiian or 
the Caucasian races.”81
Among white elites in Hawaii itself, the continued presence and power of native 
Hawaiians added a dimension to racial constructions of Asian migrants as “coolies” not 
present elsewhere. Many immigration proposals in the Hawaiian press came packaged as 
strategies for reversing the demographic decline of native Hawaiians as a way of 
reassuring natives, who became increasingly skeptical of plans to bring more foreigners 
to Hawaii as they become a progressively smaller demographic presence. The Pacific 
Commercial Advertiser paired an 1861 call for European immigrants with a suggestion 
that “some law of the nature of a Homestead Act, granting... to any married Hawaiian 
female, who has reared five children to the age of ten years and upwards, a bounty of a
A
certain number of acres of land.”82 In 1868, an even less probable suggestion appeared in 
a pseudonymous letter in the Advertiser, which called for allowing native Hawaiians to 
adopt children freely from the orphanages of Europe. “Bringing Chinamen, &c., will 
never repopulate Hawaii,” it argued, and “what is wanted is a class that will amalgamate 
with the native, or take his place when he is gone; a class that instead of dying out will 
increase and multiply.”83
The editors shrugged the letter off as worthy of “attention, for originality, if 
nothing else,” but the piece exemplified a rhetorical posture within immigration debates 
that called for “cognate races” capable of assimilating themselves into and replenishing 
native Hawaiian society.84 The only thing unusual about the 1868 orphan proposal had
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been that it applied the language to whites. Other Polynesians were a far more common 
object of this rhetoric. The pro-government Hawaiian Gazette, for example, noted in the 
context of proposals to import Swedes that “the transplacing of Polynesians” would 
represent “the introduction of a cognate and kindred race from the Islands west of us, of a 
healthy and vigorous stock” and “would seem the easiest and wisest means of 
accomplishing the re-invigoration of our own people.”85
This conception of “cognate race” enjoyed notable support among native 
Hawaiians. A series of native Hawaiian mass meetings in October 1869 approved the 
idea of Polynesian immigration at the same time that they denounced the planters and 
their coolie workers as usurpers of Hawaiian sovereignty. Large numbers of attendees 
walked out during speeches by Judge S.W. Mahelona and J.W. Kalua in favor of Chinese 
immigration, and those who remained booed Kalua off the stage with shouts .of “down 
with the traitor.” More popular speakers claimed that the planters “wanted slaves, in 
order to get more money,” and that imported Chinese workers were “murderers, thieves, 
and robbers.” In the end, resolutions passed in the meetings not only asserted opposition 
to Chinese immigration and “that the government should bring here the people... of a 
cognate race with ourselves, as laborers, and to increase the population of our group,” but 
also condemned the penal provisions of the Masters and Servants Act as a root cause of 
these protests.86 However, since ideas of racial difference were endlessly malleable, the 
concept of “cognate race” could be employed to different ends in different hands. In 
1876, years after the end of Henry M. Whitney’s tenure had also ended the paper’s anti­
coolie trade crusade, the Pacific Commercial Advertiser conveniently identified East
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Indians and Hawaiians as “cognate races” that could assimilate based on “their tractable 
natures and plodding habits of industry.”87
Political developments between the 1870s solidified planter power and intensified 
debates over potential sources of migrants. After the Kamehameha dynasty had died out 
with King Kamehameha V in 1872, the Hawaiian monarchy began to suffer a crisis of 
legitimacy that left it increasingly vulnerable to planter machinations. The Constitution 
provided that the legislature would elect successors. The election that brought King 
Kalakaua to power in 1874 saw widespread protests by backers of his opponent, Queen 
Emma, that started his reign on a foul note.
Meanwhile, Hawaii and the United States ratified a reciprocity treaty in 1875 that 
went into effect in 1876. The treaty allowed Hawaiian sugar and a variety of American 
products to move between the countries duty-free, and allowed the United States to 
establish a naval base at Pearl Harbor. The end of American tariff barriers caused an 
explosive expansion of the sugar industry. Sugar exports rise from 26 million pounds in 
1876 to more than 216 million pounds in 1886, accelerated the rising influence of haole 
planter elites.88 These changes emboldened planters, who demanded and received a new 
migration treaty, the Hawaiian-Japanese Labor Convention of 1886, which opened the 
door to large scale importation of Japanese workers. This did not stop the planters’ moves 
to subvert the monarchy. The king’s reliance on the eccentric Walter Murray Gibson, 
corrupt dealings involving the German-American sugar magnate Claus Spreckels, and
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perceived extravagance emboldened anti-monarchist haoles. In 1887, menaced by the 
fast-growing all-white militia company, the Honolulu Rifles, the king agreed to a new 
constitution that significantly limited his power. This “Bayonet Constitution,” as it was 
called, convinced Gibson to flee the country and foreshadowed the coup that ended the 
Hawaiian monarchy in 1893.89
The idea of “cognate races” had an especially powerful supporter in King 
Kalakaua’s mercurial adviser Walter Murray Gibson. Gibson’s early travels in the Pacific 
in the 1850s had ended when the colonial government in the Dutch East Indies 
imprisoned him on charges of fomenting rebellion in Sumatra. In his romanticized 
account of his adventures, The Prison ofWeltevreden, which he published after escaping 
and returning to America, Gibson presented himself as a friend of “the Malay race,” 
whose members he described as exhibiting “many evidences of a refined and tasteful 
civilization, of a happy disposition to receive the truths of a more convincing creed than 
their own, and a simplicity of character, and a heroism of devotion.”90 After converting to 
Mormonism and convincing Brigham Young to send him on a mission to find potential 
settlement locations for the Mormons in the Pacific, Gibson made himself leader of the 
Mormon settlement on Lanai. Gibson’s behavior in Lanai led to his excommunication 
from the LDS church, which grew suspicious when he used donations from local 
Mormons to purchase land on Lanai in his own name. Regardless of the motives behind 
his land purchases, the departure of the Mormons from Lanai left Gibson in control of
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most of the island. By the 1880s, Gibson had used the wealth from his Lanai cattle ranch 
to enter Hawaiian politics, and had become King Kalakaua’s most prominent adviser.91
Gibson never lost his fascination with the inhabitants of Malaya and Indonesia, 
whom he saw as a perfect cognate race for Hawaiians.92 In November 1886, he noted 
with glee in his diary, “The King very genial -  enthusiastic about immigration of 
Javanese.” 93 The Cabinet Council also granted him the authority to correspond with his 
former Dutch antagonists about sending laborers from the Dutch East Indies to Hawaii. 
Nothing became of this correspondence. In his role as Minister of Foreign Affairs, 
however, Gibson presided over the Hawaiian-Japanese Labor Convention of 1886, which 
ended the eighteen years of chilly relations on labor migrations that began with the Scioto 
incident. In this context, he simply transferred the mantel of “cognate race” to the 
Japanese. Gibson instructed the Hawaiian envoy to Japan, John M. Kapena, to suggest to 
the emperor that “to strengthen [King Kalakaua’s] hands is to elevate the sovereign of a 
cognate and friendly race.” Kapena echoed this idea at a government dinner in Tokyo, 
where he addressed Japanese officials saying “[Kalakaua] believes that the Japanese and 
Hawaiians spring from one cognate race, and this enhances his love for you.”94 These 
negotiations ultimately paved the way for Japanese migration to Hawaii on an
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unprecedented scale, and the Japanese workers admitted under the Labor Convention 
became the core of the plantation workforce.95
These events, which marked the beginning of the end for Hawaiian 
independence, had parallel consequences in Hawaiian racial politics and migration 
policy. They marked a definitive turn away from the free labor ideals that had infused 
debates over coolie labor in the 1860s. The 1887 constitution dropped the pretense of 
equality for Asian labor migrants, and limited suffrage to males of European, American, 
or Hawaiian descent who possessed at least three thousand dollars in taxable property. 
This represented a dramatic and significant break with the past. The pro-government 
writers who had tried to rebut Henry Martyn Whitney’s critiques of coolie labor in the 
1860s had insisted that all people, even coolies, were subject to the same laws in Hawaii. 
Now, Hawaii was unabashedly a planters’ society, without the fa9ade of legal equality. 
Seen in this light, the Hawaiian-Japanese Labor Convention of 1886 was a central 
element in consolidating planter control.
The transformations in Hawaiian labor migration of the 1880s occurred in the 
context of the implementation of the Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882 in the United States. 
Calls for restriction or exclusion had become a major political issue in the United States 
in the 1870s. The 1882 law had been made possible through an 1880 revision of the Sino- 
American Burlingame Treaty, which allowed the U.S. to suspend the admission of 
Chinese laborers. Scholars disagree when it comes to identifying the single most 
important explanation for this law, but it clearly drew on a combination of racism, 
support from the labor movement, pressure from white Californians, political
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opportunism, and anxieties about unfree labor.96 These concerns bled over into a parallel 
debate within Hawaii.
Before the 1880s, the notion that the islands were experiencing a “labor shortage” 
was rarely scrutinized. In the early 1880s, however, a significant increase in Chinese 
arrivals encouraged the growth of a movement for restrictions on Chinese immigration 
among white and native Hawaiians. When it began to implement some of these 
restrictions, the government cited disruptions in the normal flow of Chinese migrants to 
Hawaii. The passage of the Chinese Exclusion Act in the United States brought at least 
two unexpected shiploads of Chinese laborers from San Francisco in 1882. At the same 
time, a smallpox outbreak in Chinese ports in 1883 prompted the Hawaiian government 
to ask the British to suspend migration from Canton and Hong Kong.97
The Gibson administration imposed new regulations beginning in 1883, which 
sharply reduced the number of permissions granted to land Chinese workers. After 1886, 
no Chinese worker could enter Hawaii without a passport, and just before the overthrow 
of the monarchy, the Hawaiian legislature passed “An Act Restricting Chinese 
Immigration” in 1892, which drastically reduced the number of arrivals allowed. The 
nearly simultaneous enactment of Chinese restriction and Japanese immigration 
alleviated disruptions in labor supply for planters.98 In 1883, Gibson wrote to 
representatives to the United Chinese Society explaining the government’s increasing 
tendency to impose special restrictions of Chinese migrants. He assured them that “the 
Government is desirous to place all immigrants on the same footing.” Chinese migrants
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needed to be restricted, however, “in view of their all coming from ports infected by 
diseases... also in view of the fact that the ordinary immigration from China consists 
almost wholly of males.”99
The motivation for Chinese exclusion went beyond these pretexts. The exclusion 
movement drew on the same racialized understandings of who could and could not be an 
ideal free laborer that had informed debates over which types of immigrants were worth 
bringing to Hawaii. They also echoed anti-Chinese rhetoric familiar on the mainland. 
These understandings made the ideal of “free labor” less a universal goal applicable to all 
peoples than a prerogative of whites (and often in this context, native Hawaiians) to be 
asserted against threats from the Chinese. In an 1885 anti-Chinese screed, The Daily 
Bulletin of Honolulu blamed in part “a Hawaiian labor contract system which has been a 
bone of contention for several years and the direct cause of expelling nearly the whole of 
the Anglo-Saxon laborers from our soil.” The Bulletin's solution, “a free labor system,” 
would replace contract labor with a form of sharecropping. This arrangement would 
make it so that “hundreds of Chinese laborers or coolies now lying about the kingdom, 
encouraged in their idleness... would be obliged to work in our cane fields” rather than 
starting stores that competed unscrupulously with white and Hawaiian businessmen.100 
As Charles Patterson, a Honolulu house painter in another column, “Can a white man 
compete with a Chinaman? I say most emphatically, no, he cannot; living as they do in 
filth and pestilence, huddled together like so many sheep, disregarding the sanitary laws 
of the country, and living on five or ten cents’ worth of rice a day.” As for white
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aspirations to “live, as you ought to live, a Christian life. I say no; you cannot compete 
with John Chinaman and do these things.”101
Although Hawaiian planters shifted from Chinese to Japanese labor in the 1880s, 
fears about “Asiatic” threats to honest labor persisted. Samuel Gompers dramatized this 
attitude with his question, “Meat vs. Rice -  American Manhood vs. Asiatic Coolieism. 
Which Shall Survive?” A variety of mainland observers noted the threat to honest 
industry they perceived from coolie labor in Hawaii. Louisiana Congressman J. Floyd 
King spoke for many others with interests in the Louisiana sugar industry when he 
protested the continuation of Hawaiian reciprocity in 1886. “After spending untold 
millions to free the slaves in the South,” he argued the government “was maintaining a 
system of coolie labor in the Sandwich Islands akin to slavery.”102 The rise of agrarian 
political movements in the late nineteenth century sometimes infused suspicions of 
conspiracies against simple farmers into discussions of Hawaii’s labor system. On May 6, 
1897, Ranche [sic] and Range, an agricultural journal of the Pacific Northwest, 
condemned the “so-called reciprocity treaty,” saying it “retarded and crushed for the 
benefit of a few millionaires and their coolie laborers” the honest exertions of white 
farmers on the mainland by undermining their experiments with sugar beets.103 Two 
years later, after annexation, the populist Kansas Agitator made a similar warning about 
the threat Hawaiian coolie labor posed to American farmers. “As between the sugar trust 
and coolie labor on the one hand, and the interests of our American farmer on the other,”
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the Agitator asked, “who can doubt the final result?”104 Although the editors seemed to 
conflate the Sugar Trust of east coast refiners with its Hawaiian competitors, the point 
was clear: “the American farmers and their hired men do not yet recognize the extent of 
this unfair competition... they have got to wake up to their interests or the coolie slave 
system will be extended.”105
The period between white settlers’ creation of the Republic of Hawaii after 
overthrowing the monarchy in 1893 and U.S. annexation in 1898 saw continued 
importation of indentured labor. At the same time, it became increasingly clear that U.S. 
annexation could mean the end of contract labor importation. Travelling to Hawaii to 
compile a report on the 1893 coup, Georgia Senator James H. Blount found planters 
anxious about the future of contract labor in the event of annexation. From conversations 
with H.P. Baldwin and William Blaisdell, he learned that planters considered contract 
labor indispensable, and that some opposed annexation on those grounds.106 Other 
planters seem to have been more optimistic. When Blount asked Claus Spreckels if he 
thought the planters could evade U.S. labor laws, Spreckels responded that “my opinion 
is that they can not [sic], but they think they can get around the United States laws.” 
Others, including Sanford Dole, thought that even if annexation ended contract labor, the 
planters could have a close substitute. Recalling a private meeting with Dole on labor
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issues, Spreckels quoted the president as saying “I have belief that the United States will 
give us a separate law that we can get laborers here.”107
Unsurprisingly, given domestic opinion and previous American laws, Congress 
repealed Hawaii’s contract labor laws when they passed the Hawaiian Organic Act in 
1900, which established the Hawaii territorial government two years after annexation.
The law not only ended the coolie system in the specific form it had taken under the 
Masters and Servants Act and the Board of Immigration, but also reintegrated Hawaii 
into the American understanding of what “free labor” meant eighty years after New 
England missionaries left Boston with their own definition. “This is now American 
territory and it must conform to American civilization and American law,” announced the 
Honolulu Republican, “and any form of human slavery is against American law, and all 
contract labor where parties are bound for a term of years and brought here from distant 
lands is but another name for coolieism, which amounts to slavery.”108
In a way, debates over free labor in America and Hawaii had come full circle. The 
missionaries who had remolded Hawaii society beginning in 1820 had brought a vision of 
“free labor” fully consistent with an American worldview. The planter class that 
developed in part out of the mission believed themselves to be continuing this 
commitment to free labor. Their definition, ironically, facilitated the creation of a 
plantation system based on sugar cultivation through land and labor legislation that 
empowered planters. As critics pointed out, their definition also accommodated the 
importation of “coolie” labor, a practice that many observers could not distinguish from
107 Hawaiian Islands: Report o f  the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, with 
Accom panying Testimony, and Executive Documents Transmitted to Congress From January I, 1893 to 
March 10, 1894, II (Washington, 1894), 1784.
108 “Labor Conditions in Hawaii,” The Honolulu Republican, January 6, 1901, 4.
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slavery. Moves toward Chinese exclusion intersected with concerns about unfree labor, 
but did not result in the abolition of contract labor importation until 1900. Transplanted 
Americans had laid the foundations for contract labor in Hawaii under the banner of free 
labor; now, the American government abolished it on the same grounds.
This need to reconcile American and Hawaiian versions of acceptable labor 
practices did not mean that the differences between two had been developing entirely 
independently. Since the 1850s and even earlier, “free labor” had been a malleable and 
transnational concept, defined in Hawaii with reference to both Hawaiian and American 
contexts. In limited ways, free labor ideology had served as a counterweight to the rise of 
unfree labor in the form of the coolie trade. For the most part, however, the rise of 
contracted Asian plantation labor in nineteenth century Hawaii occurred with the aid of a 
vision of free labor that did not stand in the way of the sugar planters.
In one sense, the abolition of contract labor in Hawaii though American 
annexation marked a sort of emancipation. For several days after June 14, 1900 (the day 
the Organic Act became effective), Japanese workers emboldened by the change in the 
law and uncertain of the future stopped working on plantations across Hawaii.109 In the 
long run, however, most workers stayed on the plantations, and planter control of Hawaii 
remained largely intact until the mid-twentieth century. Hawaiian planters may have lost 
contract labor, but as JoAnna Poblete has recently shown, annexation gave them access to 
new sources of labor from the Philippines and Puerto Rico, areas whose residents fell
109 “Plantation Laborers Incited by Agitators,” Pacific Commercial Advertiser XXXL, no. 5576, 6; 
“Japanese Strike on Plantations,” The Honolulu Republican I, no. 10 (June 24, 1900), 1.
47
under the unenfranchised category of “U.S. colonial.”110 The meaning of “free labor” was 
never clear-cut in the nineteenth century, and that did not change in the twentieth.
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